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ABSTRACT 
Smart Grid – an intelligent connected grid consisting of millions of smart devices, used to collect data from 
the grid to improve the efficiency of its operation. These smart devices communicating wirelessly are 
susceptible to attacks and hence the security and privacy of the smart devices along with the smart grid 
is a major challenge. Blockchain-based systems provide improved security and privacy and hence gained 
a lot of attention in the recent past. This paper proposes a blockchain-based architecture for 
Neighborhood Area Networks (NANs) and Home Area networks (HANs) in Smart Grid. The paper presents 
a security analysis in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability to show that the proposed 
blockchain-based Smart Grid architecture is secure. Also, the impact of the improved security on packet 
delays, energy and computational overhead is discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In many advanced countries, the aged power grid is being renovated to be an intelligent power grid to 
improve the efficiency of power generation, transmission and distribution. In this process, the power grid 
is being installed with smart devices and sensors to automate and improve the efficiency of different 
applications such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Advanced Distribution Automation (ADA), 
Demand Response Management System (DRMS) and Outage Management System (OMS). In order to 
communicate with the smart devices, Smart Grid (SG) generally employs a two-way communication 
network. In the Distribution Smart Grid (DSG), the two-way communication network includes multiple 
sub-networks such as Neighborhood Area Networks (NANs) and Home Area Networks (HANs). A HAN 
manages the communication between smart devices within a home. A NAN is used for two-way 
communication between the neighborhood data aggregation point and HANs. A Home area Gate Way 
(HGW) and Neighborhood Gate Way (NGW) manages the inbound and out-bound traffic of HAN and NAN 
respectively. It is well known that the SG can employ different types of networking technologies like 
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) and long-range single-hop wireless networks. According to [1] and [2], 
due to its multi-hop structure and to ensure 100% connectivity of devices in SG, WMNs is favored over 
single-hop wireless networks like cellular. But this work assumes that both the cellular networks and 
WMNs are employed in DSG (Figure 1) to take advantage of the faster single-hop communication and 
100% connectivity offered by WMNs.     
  The DSG applications i.e. AMI, ADA, DRMS and OMS consists of smart devices and sensors that 
generate, process and exchange huge amounts of secure, safety-critical and privacy-sensitive data and 
hence the SG can be a target of cyber-attacks. An adversary gaining access to a single device has the 
potential to disrupt the entire power grid of a nation. The security and privacy requirements of SG 
networks are different when compared to IT networks. The security in IT networks is more focused on 
providing protection at the network center (where the data is stored), whereas the protection in SG 
networks is needed at the network center and edge [3] i.e. distributed in nature. Numerous studies have 
proposed architectures to improve the security and privacy of SG using the traditional state-of-the-art 
security solutions such as IDS, firewalls and encryption methods. However, these conventional 
mechanisms have limitations (for example: highly centralized access control) and hence they are 
unsuitable for SG [4][5]. Moreover, scalability is an important factor as a utility may install millions of 
smart devices/sensors in the field. Hence, SG communication networks demand a scalable and distributed 
secure and privacy frameworks. Blockchain (BC) technology - the building block of the cryptocurrency 
systems like Bitcoin, Ethereum, ripple etc., has the potential to overcome the above-mentioned 
challenges due to its distributed, secure and private nature.  
BC can be defined as a specific type of distributed ledger that records transactions between two 
parties in an efficient and secure manner. In simple terms, BC is a growing list of records called as blocks, 
which are linked using cryptography [6]. A block contains transaction data, cryptographic hash of the 
previous block and a timestamp. As the blocks are connected using cryptographic hash, a block in BC 
cannot be easily altered and hence the data is resistant to modification. In order to operate as a 
distributed ledger, a BC based system is typically managed by a peer-to-peer network. In BC based systems 
like Bitcoin, each user is identified by a changeable public key. In bitcoin network (BCN), certain users with 
large computational resources are categorized as miners. In order to transfer money, a user generates 
and broadcasts a new transaction to the network. Every new transaction in a BCN is validated by the 
miners and a valid transaction is pushed on to the block. A block in a BCN consists of multiple transactions 
and whenever a block is full, it is appended to the BC by a mining process [7]. As a part of the mining 
process, miners solve a cryptographic puzzle known as Proof of Work (PoW). A miner node that first solves 
the PoW appends the mined block to the BC and broadcasts the solution to the network. All the other 
miners in the network validate the solution, accept the updated BC and re-broadcast the new block. The 
miner node that solved the PoW is rewarded with bitcoins.   
Adopting BC technology to the SG comes with several challenges such as: demand for high 
computational resource to solve PoW, long latency to validate the transactions, resulting in low 
transaction rate (bitcoin - 7 transactions/sec, Ripple – 15 transactions/sec) and scalability issues due to 
broadcasting transactions and blocks to the entire network. Ali Dorri et al proposed a novel BC for Internet 
of Things (IoT) by eliminating the need for PoW and bitcoins [8]. Using Smart Home as a case study, they 
illustrated the use of BC to improve the security and privacy for IoT [9]. In this paper, with some 
modifications, we adopt the ideas presented in [8] and [9] and propose a BC-based system to improve the 
security and privacy of IoT based HANs and NANs in the DSG. The proposed architecture is as shown in 
Figure 1 (details discussed later). A local BC (LBC) is employed to provide secured access control to the 
smart devices in HANs and NANs. Also, both the LBC and a BC in remote storage maintain a chronologically 
ordered history of immutable transactions of smart devices in DSG. In this study, based on the qualitative 
analysis, we demonstrate that the proposed architecture achieves confidentiality, integrity and 
availability and discuss its potential to thwart key security attacks such as linking, Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) and modification attacks. The main contributions of this paper are: 
i) In [8] and [9], the transactions are classified into five different categories: genesis, store, monitor, 
access and remove transactions. Based on the DSG application needs, this paper introduces new 
transaction types such as: event-based transaction (EBT), OTF-read transaction (OTFT), control 
transaction (CT), alarm transaction (AT). 
ii) Proposed a BC-based architecture for DSG as shown in Figure 1. Generally, in cryptocurrency BC 
systems, every node has a copy of the BC i.e. if the BC network has N nodes, there are N copies of 
BC. But in the proposed architecture, there are only two copies of BC for each device i.e. LBC and 
remote BC (RBC), distributed at the network edge and central storage. In the BC-based smart home 
presented in [9], there is only one copy of data in LBC. Maintaining a single copy of data is a risk as 
data can be lost in the case of an attack or hardware failure. Hence, the proposed architecture 
offers redundancy by storing data in both LBC and RBC.  
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Figure 1 BC-based Distribution Smart Grid 
 
iii) Provided qualitative analysis on the security and privacy of BC-based DSG against DDoS, linking 
and modification attacks. Proposed a novel way of exploiting the multicast/broadcast transactions 
to improve the security against modification attacks in DSG.   
Remainder of the paper is organized as follows: First, the core components of the BC-based 
architecture are presented. Next, the architecture of the BC-based DSG is discussed in detail. 
Subsequently, security and BC-overhead analysis are presented before concluding the paper.               
MAIN COMPONENTS 
The details of the core components of the BC-based architecture presented in Figure 1 are discussed in 
this section. 
A. Transactions: In BC-based DSG, any exchange of data between devices in HAN and NAN are known 
as transactions. It is assumed that there exist different transactions in BC-based DSG, each 
designed for specific purpose. In addition to the genesis, store, monitor, access and remove 
transactions presented in [9], this paper introduces new transaction types such as: EBT, OTFT, CT, 
AT. The purpose and the usage of these transactions is explained as and when needed in the next 
sections. In order to secure the communication, it is assumed that all the transactions use a shared 
key. Also, it is assumed that a lightweight hashing is used to detect any changes in the content of 
the transaction during transmission [9] [10]. 
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Figure 2 DSG-BC including the structure of a transaction and the policy header 
B. DSG-BC:  In DSG, a BC keeps track of inbound and outbound transactions, authorizes devices and 
based on a policy header enforces policies. Similar to cryptocurrency BCs, considering genesis 
transaction as the first transaction, all the transactions of a device are cryptographically chained 
together as an immutable ledger in DSG-BC. In order to provide immutability and enforce policies, 
a block in DSG-BC is designed with two headers, they are: block header and policy header. The 
block header contains the hash of the previous block to keep the DSG-BC immutable. The policy 
header is used to authorize devices and enforce policies on transactions. The structure of the 
policy header and the transaction are as shown in Figure 2. The policy header structure is similar 
to the structure presented in [9] and unlike four parameters in [9], it has six parameters. They are: 
Requester (identified with Public Key), Request Type (transaction type - store, access, control etc.), 
Device ID (SM ID or thermostat ID etc.), Action (Allow or Deny the request), number of transactions 
limit and limit duration (hourly, monthly and daily). Apart from the headers, a block contains 
several transactions. In BC, for each transaction upto five parameters are stored. The parameters 
Previous Transaction and Transaction Number aid in uniquely identifying a transaction and 
chaining transactions of the same device. The third parameter Device ID indicates the ID of the 
device from which the transaction originates. The fourth parameter is the transaction type (EBT, 
OTFT, CT etc.). The fifth parameter identifies a multisig transaction and stores the signature of the 
requester. In this study, as mentioned above, it is assumed that there exist two types of BCs. They 
are: LBC and RBC. Depending on its location, LBC is categorized as HAN-BC and NAN-BC. A HAN-
BC is maintained by the HGW miner whereas a NAN-BC is managed by the NGW miner. As a SM 
sends data to both the CC and utility storage, there exists an RBC at both the CC and utility, 
respectively known as CC-RBC and U-RBC. As the purpose of the U-RBC is to store/manage the 
data, store transaction (ST) and read transaction are the only allowed transaction types in its 
policy header. On the other hand, the CC-RBC handles OTFT, CT, AT and EBT along with the store 
and read transactions. Hence, all the transaction types are allowed in its policy header.            
C. DSG-Miner: A DSG-Miner handles several key functions such as authentication, authorization, 
auditing transactions, generating genesis transactions, distributing and updating keys, 
maintaining the transaction structure. Also, the miner processes inbound and outbound 
transactions in its network (HAN or NAN). The miner collects transactions into a block and once a  
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Figure 3 Arrangement of data in Local BC and Remote BC 
block is full, appends it to the BC. The DSG-Miner can be built into the internet gateway or a 
standalone device that can be placed between gateway and devices. As mentioned above, the 
proposed architecture has three different types of miners, they are HGW miner, NGW miner and 
storage miner (RBC). The number of devices handled by HGW can be around 10, NGW can be 
around 100 and storage miner are in the order of 1000s. HGW and NGW miners maintain 2 copies 
of BCs i.e. control center BC and utility BC for each SM handled by them. Figure 3 shows the 
arrangement of data in LBC (HGW, NGW) and RBC (CC-RBC and U-RBC). As shown in Figure 3, for 
each SM, two copies of data are stored, one in LBC and other in RBC.   
D. Overlay Network: As shown in Figure 1, HGW and NGW miners constitute an overlay network 
along with cloud storage, utilities, CC and remote terminal units (RTUs). The overlay network is 
similar to the peer-to-peer network in bitcoin and offers distributed feature to the proposed 
architecture. According to [2] and [9], as shown in Figure 1, 6LoWPAN (IPV6 over Low-Power 
Wireless Personal Area Networks) technology is used for NAN and HAN communications. It is 
assumed that the external communication (i.e. to utility or CC) of a NAN is based on long-range 
cellular. Also, wired public IP network is assumed to be used to store data to cloud. 
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Figure 4 Illustration of data flow between device and remote storage using single shared key and two 
shared keys  
THE BC-BASED DISTRIBUTION SMART GRID 
This section describes the initialization steps of adding new devices, defining policy header and transaction 
handling in the BC-based DSG. 
A. Initial Setup: In order to add a new device to the HAN or NAN, the corresponding DSG-miner 
creates a genesis transaction by sharing a key with the device using generalized Diffie-Hellman 
(DH) [11]. In the case of SMs, as the data is also stored to RBC, key must be shared with the storage 
miner as well. As the key must be known to 3 entities i.e. device, storage miner and local miner, 
the following two different mechanisms can be employed to exchange the key:  
a. Two different DH key exchanges i.e. one between local miner and the device and the 
other between the local and remote miners are done. Hence, different shared key is used 
to exchange data between device and local miner and between local and remote miners. 
b. Single DH key exchange between 3 entities. In this case, same shared key is used for data 
exchange between the device and local miner and the local and remote miner.  
Figure 4 illustrates the ST data flow based on the above mentioned two schemes. The difference 
between two schemes is self-explanatory. The shared key is stored in the genesis transaction of 
the device’s LBC and RBC. This work assumes that each device has its own BC. In the case of SMs, 
LBC i.e. HAN-BC maintains two BCs per each SM, corresponding to CC-RBC and U-RBC. Regarding 
the policies, using a software interface provided by the company that installs the HAN-BC, home 
owner creates/updates policies for HAN based on the policy header structure presented in Figure 
2 and adds it to the first block of its HAN-BC. A portion of the policies in HAN are setup/updated 
exclusively by the external entities such as utilities to create/update policies related to SMs 
(electric, gas and water). Home owners are not authorized to update the policies related to SMs 
as they may modify the settings to reduce the utility charges. The policy header in the NAN will 
be initially setup by the utility and any future updates will be done via internet. A DSG-miner 
makes decisions based on the policy header from the most recent block in BC. Hence, policy 
updates are always applied to the current block’s policy header. 
B. HAN Transactions: A device in HAN may operate based on the data requested from another 
device. For example, Thermostat controls AC (turn on/off) based on the data collected from the 
temperature sensor. In order to secure the data exchange and keep track of the transactions, a 
shared key is allocated (based on the policy header) by the HGW miner to devices that exchange 
data. Devices can exchange data as long as the key is valid. The miner invalidates the key by 
sending control messages to the devices. A device can store data to LBC and/or RBC using a ST. In 
[8] and [9], procedure to store the data to cloud i.e. remote storage is discussed. It employs 
anonymous authentication but the mechanism to secure the data transfer is not explained. This 
section discusses the mechanism to securely transfer the data to remote storage. 
          A SM generates a ST to store data to both LBC and RBC. When an HGW miner receives a ST 
from an SM, as shown in Figure 4, it decrypts and stores the payload to the HAN-BC. Next, the 
miner extracts the hash and the block-number of the last transaction from the HAN-BC, appends 
it to the new data, creates a new ST and sends it to the RBC. If the block-number and the hash of 
the last transaction extracted from the LBC match with ones stored in RBC, SM is authenticated. 
As the RBC has the shared key, it decrypts the data after authentication. At the end of a ST 
processing, RBC and LBC of a device are synchronized w.r.t blocks, transactions in blocks and hash 
of the data. The same procedure can be applied to any HAN device that intends to store data 
securely to the cloud.  
C. NAN Transactions: Similar to HAN, the data exchange between NGW miner and an RTU in a NAN 
is based on a shared key allocated by the NGW miner. The mechanism to process non-HGW miner 
(RTU) store transactions is similar to the HAN store transactions discussed above. In the case of 
HGW miner (ex: SM transactions), NGW miner authenticates the transaction and forwards it to 
the appropriate destination.    
D. DSG Transactions: Most of the DSG transactions are hierarchical transactions i.e. the data 
exchange between the utility or CC and a HAN happens via a NAN. An OTFT is generated by CC to 
read the power consumption data, on-the-fly from the SM. When the NGW miner receives a read 
request from the CC, the miner validates the request and forwards the request to the 
corresponding HGW miner. HGW miner authenticates the request, reads data on-the-fly from the 
SM and sends it back to the CC via NAN.  
An EBT is generated by a SM to report an event such as power outage. The data 
encapsulated in an EBT is sent to the CC and the data transfer mechanism is similar to the ST 
described earlier. In DRMS, CC remotely controls the smart electrical devices in a customer’s home 
depending on the peak electricity demand. In order achieve this, a CT is sent by the CC to turn 
on/off a smart device. The data exchange mechanism of a CT between the CC and a smart 
electrical device in a HAN occurs via NAN and it is similar to an OTFT. 
 
SECURITY ANALYSIS 
 
This section analyzes the security and privacy of the BC-based DSG. In order to maintain the 
security of information in SG and keep it protected, the National Institute of Standard and 
Technology (NIST) has defined three main requirements, namely: Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability, known as CIA [12]. Confidentiality ensures that only the authorized entity can access 
the information. Integrity ensures that the transmitted data is received at the destination without 
any modifications and availability makes sure that the computational and communication 
resources are available to a device when it is needed. Table 1 summarizes the mechanisms 
employed by the proposed BC-based architecture that aid in resisting against device, data and 
privacy attacks to meet the security requirements in DSG. 
Table 1 Security Requirements Analysis 
Requirement Mechanism Employed 
   Confidentiality Symmetric encryption is employed to achieve confidentiality 
       Integrity Achieved using hashing 
     Availability Achieved by limiting the number of valid transactions per device and the 
miner 
   User Control Achieved by transaction logging in local BC 
   Authorization Policy header, block hash and shared keys are used to authorize devices 
                                                            
To increase the network resource availability, smart devices should be protected from 
malicious requests. As per [9], this requirement can be met by limiting the number of transactions 
(per hour or per day) to those entities with which each device has established a shared key. In the 
proposed architecture, as shown in Figure 2, the limit on the number of transactions is stored in 
the policy header. As all the transactions are authorized by the miners, the limit will be enforced 
by them. There are two types of AMI data: low-frequency data (once per week) sent to utilities 
for billing purpose and high-frequency data (3-4 times per hour) contains power usage patterns 
sent to CC, used for real-time control and optimization [5]. Hence, the limit on the number of STs 
for low-frequency and high-frequency data is once per week and 3-4 times per hour respectively. 
In DRMS, utility can send control messages to turn on/off customer’s AC multiple times per day. 
Hence, the limit on the DRMS CT is 3-4 times per day. Thus, the limit on the number of transactions 
can be varied depending on the type of the data and type of the DSG application.     
DDoS attack is a major attack that affects the network availability [5]. In the literature, 
multiple studies analyzed the impact of DDoS attack on smart grids [13]. Also, the SM data can be 
analyzed to establish the link between electricity consumption and customer presence in the 
home to perform physical attacks such as robbery. Also, as the DSG collects and stores the data, 
it is important to study the data modification attacks. Hence, we analyze the effectiveness of the 
proposed solution to handle the critical security attacks such DDoS, linking and modification 
attacks in DSG. 
A. DDoS Attack: The proposed design offers multiple levels of defense against this attack. As the 
SG devices are directly inaccessible, the first level of defense comes from the fact that it is 
extremely difficult for an adversary to install malware on them. Despite this inaccessibility, if 
the adversary somehow manages to obtain access to the device and attempts to flood the 
DSG network, the miner offers the second level of defense as it monitors all the outbound 
traffic. As the policy header puts a limit on the number of transactions, if a compromised 
device generates an abnormal amount of traffic, the miner will send an alarm transaction to 
the concerned authority (sending a message to the customer in the case of HAN and utility in 
the case of NAN) about the excessive traffic. The concerned authority takes the necessary 
steps to identify the compromised device and recover from the attack. During the 
identification and recovery process, the compromised device may continue to generate the 
abnormal traffic. Hence, the proposed design assumes that the miner is equipped with 
multiple communication and computational resources such that the legitimate traffic flows 
uninterrupted even during attack, compromised device identification and recovery. Also, the 
miner does not forward the abnormal traffic into the network. The limit on the number of 
transactions is applied to the outbound transactions of miners as well. 
B. Linking Attack:  To protect against this attack, each SG device’s data is shared and stored 
using a unique key. Also, the key can be varied depending on the type of the data. For 
example: as mentioned before, SM sends two types of messages, low-frequency data 
destined to the utility and high-frequency data to the control center. So, to increase the 
protection level, two different keys i.e. Low Frequency Unique Key (LFUK) to store low-
frequency data and High Frequency Unique Key (HFUK) to store high-frequency data. For each 
devices data type, DSG-BC creates unique ledger of data using different PK. 
C. Modification Attack: In order to launch this attack, the attacker must compromise the storage 
security. The adversary may then attempt to delete or modify the data of a device. As 
mentioned above, in the proposed architecture, a device generating the ST is authorized by 
storage miner by comparing the block number and hash of the last transaction of the device 
against the ones stored in the RBC. Hence, any change in the device’s stored data will be 
automatically detected during a new store transaction. In order to complicate the scenario, 
let’s assume that along with the storage, HAN-0 device’s LBC is also compromised and hence 
the attacker can modify the device’s data in LBC and RBC. Hence, the comparison of device’s 
hash at the RBC and LBC cannot detect the attack. In this case, we propose the idea of 
exploiting the multicast/broadcast packet transmissions in SG networks to aid in detecting 
the data breaches. According to [14], electricity pricing and DRMS control data is 
communicated as multicast/broadcast transactions to the SMs by the utility/control center. 
As shown in Figure 1, broadcast transactions 1 and 8 are part of the LBCs at NGWs, HGWs and 
storage. Hence, NGW-1 and NGW-2 can generate read transactions (periodically) to read 
HAN-0 device’s broadcast data from the storage and independently compare with their own 
LBC broadcast data. If HAN-0 broadcast data mis-compares with their own data, NGW-1 and 
NGW-2 will send an alarm transaction to the control center indicating that the HAN-0 device 
is compromised. In a larger SG network, the number of NGW’s can be in 100s. Hence, for each 
HAN device that stores data to storage, we must select the corresponding NGWs to 
periodically read and compare the broadcast transactions. The procedure to select the NGWs, 
how many NGWs must be selected for reading/comparing and how often broadcast/multicast 
packets are compared are part of the future study.  
 
BLOCK CHAIN OVERHEAD ANALYSIS 
  
                As discussed above, BC-based system has the potential to improve the security and 
privacy of a DSG. But the improved security and privacy can result in packet, energy and 
computational overhead. According to the simulations presented in [9] for BC-based smart home, 
the increased payload sizes due to encryption and hashing in BC-based systems have relatively 
smaller effect compared to the lower layer header overhead in 6LoWPAN. Also, delay overhead 
is ~20 msec and the energy consumption of the 6LoWPAN devices increases by ~60% [9]. Unlike 
the transmission SG [15], where there are stringent timing requirements (< 1 sec), DSG 
applications are not time critical. Hence, 10’s of msec of delay overhead is not an issue. Unlike 
electricity SMs, that rely on power from grid, gas and water SMs are battery operated. Therefore, 
for gas and water SMs, it is a trade-off between the energy overhead (~60%) and the improved 
security offered by the BC-based systems. As the traffic generated by the wireless SMs is not very 
high, they operate for many years without replacing the battery. Hence, our recommendation is 
that 60% overhead is not very high, and the security and privacy of BC-based systems outweigh 
the energy overhead. 
As mentioned before, HGW/NGW miners monitor the inbound and outbound 
transactions, enforce the policy header rules, manage shared key for data exchange and maintain 
the LBC. These operations incur energy and computational overhead. As discussed above, the 
proposed architecture assumes that miner is integrated as a part of internet gateway and unlike 
the smart devices that are battery operated, miner has a continuous power supply. Hence, energy 
consumption is not an issue. As mentioned above, SMs generate 3-4 packets per hour, DRMS 
generates 3-4 packets a day, during an outage OMS generates 1 packet. Hence, the average 
number of packets generated by DSG applications is low i.e. around 10-15 per hour. Therefore, 
the computational and storage resources needed to maintain LBC for DSG applications is not very 
high. If home automation devices (ex: google NEST), are also included in HAN-BC, the storage and 
computational resource requirement may increase. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In summary, this paper presented a Block Chain based architecture for NANs and HANs in 
distribution smart grid. Also, discussed various components, transactions and processes involved 
in the data exchange. Unlike the traditional centralized security systems, the proposed BC-based 
system distributes the security at network edge and center. The paper presented a security 
analysis to qualitatively explain the effectiveness of the proposed architecture to handle security 
attacks such as DDoS, linking and modification attacks. In this process, a novel way of using 
broadcast/multicast transactions to detect data modification attacks is proposed. Also, based on 
the BC overhead analysis, it is concluded that the delay, energy and computational overhead is 
not significant and hence is not an impediment to build the BC-based Distribution Smart Grid.        
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